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We investigate the effectiveness of a government subsidy and mitigation based 
insurance contracts at discouraging migration into the wildland interface and at inducing 
incentives for risk mitigation. We construct a model of the individual migration decision, 
where the individual maximizes expected utility defined over attributes of locations 
including cost of insurance and mitigation, wildfire damage, and the availability of a 
subsidy for reducing wildfire risks through fuel management. Our analysis shows that 
standard insurance policies provide inefficiently weak incentive for wildfire risk 
mitigation by offering a low insurance premium to high-risk landowners. We find on the 
other hand that in the presence of optimal government subsidy, contingent contracts 
provide an efficient solution where a homeowner chooses a mitigation level that 
maximizes social benefit and insurers provide actuarially fair contracts such that each 
individual is offered a premium of the exact value of her wildfire risk. Optimal wildfire insurance in the wildland-urban interface in the presence of a 




Changing demographics in fire-prone areas, coupled with rising fire expenditures 
and externalities associated with little fire risk mitigation make wildfire risk management 
a growing policy concern. Today, roughly 38.6 millions of people live in fire-prone 
environments, resulting in an average of 900 structures destroyed each year, escalating 
fire suppression expenditures, and increasing threats to public safety (ISO, 1997, 
Sampson et al, 2000, Cleaves, 2001).  
Migration decisions to rural areas are influenced by various factors including 
amenities values, privacy, etc (Mckee et al, 2004). Homeowners are drawn to these areas 
by their preferences for natural settings, spectacular views and location amenities values. 
However, these new owners of property in wildland-urban interfaces often pay little 
attention to the natural hazard surrounding their homes, or the risks of financial losses 
they and the entire taxpaying population might incur from wildfires (Kovacs, 2001). The 
literature provides evidence that fire risk mitigation generates private risk reduction 
benefits as well as positive externalities in terms of fire damage risks. Yet, homeowners’ 
preferences for natural settings, financial and labor costs, and lack of experience 
represent serious barriers to the adoption and implementation of fire risk mitigation 
measures (Hodgson 1995, Kovacs 2001, Brenkert et al, 2005). With weak private 
incentives for fire prevention, suppression becomes the main tool for wildlife damage reduction. Currently, more than two billion dollars are spent annually on public wildfire 
suppression and risk mitigation efforts (Ingalsbee, 2000). 
Financial loss from wildfire also affects property owner insurance companies, 
since standard homeowner policies usually cover wildfire damage (Brillinger, 2003). In 
1991, roughly $1.7 billion was disbursed in insured losses caused by the 
Oakland/Berkeley Tunnel Fire (ISO, 1997). More recently, more than $3 billions were 
paid by the industry following the large wildfires in California in the 1990’s (Kovacs, 
2001 (ISO report (1997)). Arguably, the misalignment of homeowners’ incentives with 
risky choice is encouraged by the current type of insurance contract, which provides a 
wildfire coverage that is not contingent upon individuals’ risk mitigation effort. Studies 
have criticized the shortcomings of the current situation and suggested that insurance 
companies design insurance so that high premiums are correlated with high fire risk in 
order to discourage people from building in areas with high risk (Reice, 2003). 
Recognizing that wildfire risk mitigation could be instrumental in reducing average 
insurance claims, private insurance companies are taking steps towards mitigation-based 
insurance for communities in fire-prone areas (e.g. in the states of Colorado, Arizona, 
New Mexico and Nevada). Homeowners’ non-compliance with the insurance program’ 
requirements might result in either the non-renewal of the coverage policy or a higher 
premium (USDA, 2003). Hence, the contingent insurance increases the homeowners’ 
opportunity cost of not taking risk protective measures. 
Also in response to increasing wildfire risks in wildland-urban interfaces, state 
and federal agencies including the U.S. Forest Service are promoting a variety of programs for strengthening risk mitigation incentives (McKee et al, 2004). Cost-sharing 
programs (CSP) for risk mitigation in the wildland-urban interface are one important part 
of this incentive policy approach in several states in the Western US. These programs 
make funding available to counties and communities to subsidize the creation of 
defensible space around structures, fuel breaks, and the disposal of slash (Steelman et al, 
2004). For instance, New Mexico pays up to 75 percent of the total cost of certain risk 
mitigation measures, and Colorado and Arizona have a 50/50 cost-share program.  By 
reducing the cost of mitigation to homeowners, the subsidy is expected to strengthen 
incentives for investments in fire protection measures, which in principle will translate 
into fire damage reduction to participants and their neighbors.  
While contingent insurance contracts are expected to realign individuals’ 
incentives for risk mitigation, and cost share subsidies may offer a solution to the 
problem of under-provision of mitigation, the effectiveness of these programs at deterring 
migration to fire prone environments and inducing incentives for mitigation is yet 
unknown. For instance, the effectiveness of contingent contracts for homeowner policy 
coverage at discouraging settlements in fire prone environments and inducing more 
investment in risk mitigation in wildland urban interfaces is yet to be determined. Also, 
while government subsidy may promote risk mitigation efforts for residents of the urban-
wildland interface, it can be criticized on the ground that it might have the unintended 
effect of encouraging migration into urban/wildland interfaces (Wright and Rossi 1981, 
Gardner and El-Abd 1984).  
The combination and implementation of government subsidy and mitigation-contingent insurance policies is a new trend that has tended to occur concurrently in the 
same vicinities.
1 The economic interactions between these two contractual mechanisms 
are not well understood. For example, it is unclear the extent to which economies of 
scope are driving the simultaneous development of these programs, or if it is simply 
because these areas face exceptionally imperfect insurance markets that are independent 
of potential positive externalities from private wildfire risk mitigation.  Furthermore, 
although it seems relatively obvious that both subsidies and mitigation-contingent 
contracts will induce more private risk mitigation, it is unclear whether taken together 
these programs will promote or reduce incentives to migrate to high-risk areas.  
These new developments provide an unprecedented setting to examine this 
interaction. We construct a model of individual migration decision where individuals 
maximize expected utility defined over attributes of locations. Attributes may include 
cost of insurance, cost of wildfire risk mitigation, resource damage from wildfire, and the 
availability of a subsidy for mitigation. We use this model (1) to discuss individuals’ 
incentives for ‘moving to the hazard’, (2) to examine individuals’ incentives for risk 
mitigation and (3) to discuss economic efficiency of contingent contracts in the presence 
of a subsidy for risk mitigation.  
Our analysis shows that standard insurance policies provide inefficiently weak 
incentive for wildfire risk mitigation by offering a low insurance premium to high-risk 
landowners. We find on the other hand that insurance contracts contingent upon 
mitigation effort provide a second best optimum in the sense that homeowners choose a 
                                                 
1 For instance, in the states of Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, cost share programs are available and the 
mitigation against insurance program is also underway since 2003 (USDA, 2003). positive level of mitigation that maximizes their private benefit and insurers provide 
actuarially fair contracts such that each individual is offered a premium of the exact value 
of her wildfire risk. The analysis shows that an efficient solution is obtained under 
contingent insurance contract, when government subsidy is chosen such that it covers the 
external benefits from mitigation. 
The next section describes a model of the current standard practice in wildfire 
insurance in which the same insurance contract is offered to all individuals regardless of 
their risk level. We discuss the implications of this contract on individuals’ incentive 
structure. This model is then modified and extended in section 3 to show that, when 
contingent contracts are offered in the presence of an optimal subsidy, individuals’ 
incentives are properly aligned with their risky choices. In section 4, we discuss policy 
implications of our findings. 
 
2. Wildfire insurance contracts: the current setting 
The economy consists of N risk-averse households who make the decision (1) to 
move to location j, and if they choose to move to a high-risk area, (2) they decide 
whether or not to invest in wildfire risk mitigation. Both decisions are made at once, 
based on the outcome of households’ utility maximization. Let Vj be the household initial 
endowment, which represents the location amenity value. Because the relocation area can 
either be a wildland-urban interface (w) or urban vicinity (u), households’ expected utility 
is affected by the risk of wildfire and other costs and losses associated with this risk. Given that individuals are risk averse, we suppose that they account for the cost of 
insurance and the expected costs for fire risk mitigation in their decision process.  
Let r be the fixed cost per unit of mitigation effort e when the homeowner decides 
to move into a urban/wildland area, so that the total cost of risk mitigation is C (e) = r e. 
Denote by πj(e) be the probability of wildfire in location j= (w, u). In the event of a fire, 
each individual in urban population (Nu) incurs a loss βuD ≤ Vu with probability πu(e), and 
each individual in the urban/wildland population (Nw) incurs a loss  βwD  ≤ V w  with 
probability πw(e), such that 0≤πu(e) < πw(e)<1. The total loss is D =(βu + βw)D , and the 
total population is N=Nu+ Nw .  
2.1. Standard insurance (pooling contract) with no subsidy for risk mitigation 
Standard homeowners’ insurance policies include coverage for wildfire damage 
(Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Services Office).
2 Yet, these policies are not 
contingent upon mitigation effort. Insurers offer the same contract (pooling contract) (P, 
Q) to all households, with average premium P and compensation (net amount) Q in case 
of fire.
3 Following Laffont (1990), calculation of the premium P for a pooling contract is 
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2 http://www.iii.org/, http://www.iso.com/. 
3 As we shall see later in the paper, contingent contracts can improve efficiency by strengthening 
policyholder incentives for risk mitigation.  A fundamental question that arises from this is: why aren’t all 
insurance policies contingent on risk mitigation?  We will make the implicit assumption here that 
contingent contracts require monitoring by the insurance agency, and that monitoring is costly. If 
monitoring costs a fixed value per contract, then this assumption does not change the marginal results 
discussed in this paper in substantive qualitative ways. Where
w w u u e e π π π π π < < < < ) ( ) ( , and 
N
N u , 
N
N w  are the proportions of people in 
urban and wildland-urban interfaces.
4 The expected profit of the insurer is:  
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Competition drives profit to zero, which implies the premium 
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Assume that a homeowner buys insurance contract (P, Q). Then, she gets x1 if fire occurs 
and x2 if no fire such that  
   Q D re V x j j + − − = β 1   
And       P V x j − = 2
Recalling that unlike insurers, homeowners know and account for the fact that their 
mitigating behavior affects their wildfire risk such that an individual Nj is subject to 
wildfire risk πj(e), the homeowners’ problem is then to choose the mitigation level e and 
contract (P,Q) such as to maximize the following expected utility: 
  [] [ ] 2 1
) , ( ,
)) ( 1 ( ) ( x U e x U e EU j j
Q P e Max π π − + =            (3) 
To derive the first order condition with respect to mitigation level and compensation, we 
explicitly write expected utility (3) as a function of e and Q by substituting insurance 
premium P, and compensation Q by their respective values and rearranging.  
                                                 
4 Note that we consider a risk level contingent upon mitigation πj (e) and a risk level non-contingent upon 
mitigation πj. This is because the insurers do not factor in mitigation effort, and in determining expected 
profit, consider that a homeowner in area j =u, w is subject to risk of wildfire risk πj (non contingent upon 
mitigation effort); while homeowners know their real exposure to wildfire, also know how their mitigating 
behavior may affect their wildfire risk, and consider a risk exposure πj (e) (contingent on mitigation). First, since we assume that the homeowner buys the contract (P, Q), we can substitute the 
value of the premium P (from equation 2) in her expected gain, x2 such that:  




− =        ( 4 )  
Then, since  Q D re V x j j + − − = β 1 , we can derive the compensation  , which 
is then substituted in equation (4) as: 
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Rearranging, we obtain: 
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Then, substituting x1 and x2 by their respective values, expected utility (3) can be written 
as: 
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First order condition with respect to e is: 
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Since we assume that actuarially fair contracts are available, risk averse agents always 
insure themselves completely to obtain the same utility regardless of the event that occurs (Laffont, 1990). Following Laffont (1990), complete insurance means u’(x1) = u’(x2). 
This implies that the first order condition with respect to e can be written: 
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Since ,  0 ) ( ' 2 > x U 0 ) ( 1 > − e j π π ,   0 > r  ; we must have that the level of mitigation is 
zero (e
*=0) regardless of the location chosen: urban or urban/wildland. 
5 Our first, 
perhaps most obvious result is: 
Proposition 1: Standard insurance is ineffective at inducing incentive for wildfire risk 
mitigation. 
 
Given the chosen level of mitigation e
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5 Note that the absence of incentive for mitigation (i.e. e
*=0) is a reasonable result here because we assume 
that homeowners insure themselves completely (no deductible).  
6 Recall that  Q D re V x j j + − − = β 1  is a function of Q so that the second element of expected utility (6) can also be 
derived with respect to Q  which can also be written as: 
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Similarly, for high-risk group π π π > >
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Results [9] and [10] show that the pooling contract (P, Q) is not an optimal choice for 
residents or prospective residents of the wildland- urban interface. 
 
Proposition 2: Standard insurance promotes building in fire-prone environment by 
offering high-risk individuals (defined as those living in the urban-wildland interface) a 
premium (P) smaller than their wildfire risk (Pw). 
 
Propositions 1-2 highlight two important issues arising under the standard 
insurance policy coverage. First, we find that since the contracts offered do not factor in 
homeowners’ mitigation efforts and yet provide coverage for wildfire damage, 
homeowners have little incentive for investing in risk mitigation. Second, we find that 
under the standard policy coverage, insurers offer high-risk households a premium lower 
than their wildfire probability,  thus promoting further building in fire-prone 
environments. A company offering such contract risks losing low-risk policyholders, 
which is a common adverse selection result given non-contingent contracts. An additional issue that relates to social optimality concerns the externalities 
resulting from little or no mitigation where it would be appropriate. When the 
homeowner mitigates wildfire risk on her land, she is likely to mitigate fire risk on her 
neighbors’ land. And because some benefits of wildfire risk mitigation are extended to 
neighboring landowners, cost-sharing programs could be justified to effectively induce 
landowners to internalize these benefits to neighbors. Next, we discuss the introduction of 
a subsidy in the context of a standard contract. 
2.2. Standard pooling insurance contract with subsidy for wildfire risk reduction 
One common government intervention approach to encourage positive external 
benefits is the use of subsidies. Suppose that the cost of mitigating is shared by a 
government agency such that homeowners pay a percentage α for of the total cost such 
that their expected cost is (α r e), where α can take values (α =0, 0<α <1, α =1). Let (1- 
α) be the subsidy provided by the agency. If α =0, then the full cost of fire risk mitigation 
is covered by the CSP subsidy, and households pay nothing. If 0<α <1, then the cost of 
fire risk mitigation is partially covered by the CSP subsidy, in which case only a partial 
externalization of the costs exists. Finally, if α =1, the full cost of fire risk mitigation is 
borne by households. Given this specification, homeowner gets x3 if a fire occurs and x4 
is no fire occurs, such that  
Q D re V x j j + − − = β α 3  
And  
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 (11) 
The optimal mitigation level and insurance contract are identical to the previous 
case, with first order conditions shown by equations 7, 9, 10. Homeowners choose to 
exert zero mitigation (e*=0) with the subsidy. This suggests that making a subsidy 
available in the standard insurance contract context is not an effective approach to 
creating incentives for fire prone environment residents (or prospective residents) to 
mitigate the risk of wildfire. For a subsidy to have any effect in this framework, we 
would need to relax our assumption of full insurance to make the homeowner liable for 
covering some of her expected loss from wildfire. In fact, if there is a deductible, that is, 
if landowners have to pay say, $X, of the damage to their property in the event of a fire 
under a standard contract, then they will have some limited incentive to mitigate the risk.  
 
Proposition 3: Subsidies are likely to be ineffective at inducing private wildfire 
risk mitigation under standard pooling contracts. 
 
As summarized in propositions 1-3 standard insurance policies present some 
challenging issues in terms of incentive for wildfire risk mitigation. Yet, the insurance 
industry has the potential, by working closely with governments and individuals, to 
properly align individuals’ incentives with risky choices. Insurances companies are acting 
upon the limitations of the standard insurance policy by moving towards insurance 
contracts that are contingent on policyholder risk mitigation.  3. Efficient wildfire insurance in the presence of government intervention through a 
subsidy for risk mitigation  
In this section, we analyze the implications of insurance contracts contingent upon 
investment in fire risk mitigation in terms of incentives for mitigation and disincentives 
for ‘moving to the hazard’. We discuss the efficiency of this type of contract with and 
without subsidy programs. 
3.1. Contingent insurance contracts for wildfire risk 
The economy consists of the same group of N agents introduced previously. 
Insurers offer a contract contingent on effort e,  ( ) ) ( ), ( e Q e P j j  with premium ,  and 
compensation  in case of fire. The expected profit of the insurer is:  
) (e Pj
) (e Q j
) ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( )( ( e P e e Q e j j j j π π − + − = Π       ( 1 2 )  
Competition drives profit to zero, which implies the actuarially fair premium 
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Given that homeowners buy contracts ( ) ) ( ), ( e Q e P j j , they get x5 if a fire occurs and x6 is no 
fire such that:  
) ( 5 e Q D e r V x j j j + − − = β  
) ( 6 e P e r V x j j − − =  
Following the same reasoning as before, we substituting premium Pj(e) and 
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This time, both insurers and homeowners account for wildfire risks contingent upon 
mitigation in their respective objective functions. In this case, the homeowner’s problem 
is to find the optimal contract ( ) ) ( ), ( e Q e P j j  given the mitigation level e that they choose to 
maximize the following expected utility: 
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First order condition with respect to eis: 
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The contingent insurance contract allows u’(x5) = u’(x6) and therefore the first condition 
with respect to e is: 
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Because all elements on the left hand side of equation [16] are non-negative, we must 
have that the optimal level of mitigation is non-zero (e
p>0). In other words, homeowners 
choose non negative level of mitigation e
p>0,  such that their marginal cost for risk 
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Given the optimal private mitigation level  >0, the compensation  is derived 
from the following first order condition: 
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Combination of results [18] and [19] constitute the following optimal insurance contract 
for households  





p p p p
β π β π )) ( 1 ( , ) ( ) ( ), ( − =      (20) 
Substituting the optimal contract in the first order condition [18], we can rewrite it as: 
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Proposition 4: Under a contingent contract, a homeowner chooses mitigation level e
p >0 
and insurers offer a premium of the exact value of her private wildfire risk.  Keys findings from the implementation of contingent contracts are the induction 
of incentives for mitigation and the realignment of incentive with risky choices by the 
provision of a contract that reflect individuals’ risk. For instance, assuming that the risk 
of wildfire is zero in urban area, a homeowner in such vicinity suffers a loss βuD with 
probability πu (e
p) =0 and therefore does not need a wildfire coverage included in her 
policy.
7 A wildland-urban interface resident on the other hand suffers a loss βwD with 
probability πw(e
p)>0. Such homeowner chooses to mitigate until her private marginal 
benefit in terms of damage reduction equals the unit cost of mitigation at the margin 
D e r w
p
w β π ) ( ' − = .  
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reflects the landowner’s mitigation level.  
Results [20] and [21] show that implementation of contingent contracts strengthen 
private incentive for investments in fire protection measures and deter new developments 
in fire hazard areas. However, this result corresponds to a second best optimum. A 
homeowner in the urban/wildland interface chooses the level of mitigation that optimizes 
her private benefits without consideration for risk reduction provided to her neighbors. In 
her expected utility, the homeowner only tries to reduce privately born resource damage 
(βjD) in the case of a fire, while a higher level of mitigation could reduce not only 
privately born damage (βjD), but also damage to others (1-βj) D.  
                                                 
7 Here we are discussing specifically the part of the insurance premium that covers wildfire damage. Note 
that a complete policy would offer a total premium TP which include not only the premium  for 
wildfire coverage but also a premium ( I ) for coverage of other elements that the homeowners chooses to 
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j + = ) (  .  In figure 3-1.A, we represent the optimal private level of mitigation obtained in 
condition [21]. Since the homeowner does not account for the benefit of her mitigating 
action on the others, she chooses a level of mitigation e
p such that private net benefit are 
maximized, that is when marginal private benefits equals marginal cost, MPB = MC 
(point A). For the same level of mitigation, figure 3-1.A shows that social efficiency is 
not achieved because marginal social benefit is higher than the marginal cost, MSB>MC, 
(point C).   
Figure 3-1: Optimal private and social mitigation level in the presence of positive 
externalities provided by fire risk mitigation 
Figure 3-1.A: Optimal private solution    Figure 3-1.B: Optimal social solution  
 Risk mitigation 












*, MPB=MC (point B) 
  
For level e
















  mitigation   
 













MEB   
A  
For level e
p, MPB=MC (point A) 
For level e
p, MSB > MC (point C) 
e
p  e






Social efficiency can be obtained by choosing a level e
* > e
p of mitigation such 
that the marginal external benefits from risk mitigation (MEB) are privately internalized 
and the socially efficient solution is in point B (figure 3-1.B). Mathematically, the social 
optimization problem is: {} {
{}
,( ) , ( )
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First order conditions show that the socially optimal solution is to choose level of 
mitigation e
* is such that: 
       { } { } D e D e D e r j j j j j ) ( ' ) 1 )( ( ' ) ( '
∗ ∗ ∗ − = − − + − = π β π β π       (23) 
or    MC = MPB+MEB = MSB    as displayed in figure 3-1.B 
Given the mitigation level e
*, the following contingent contracts are available   
( ) ( ) D e D e e Q e P j j j j )) ( 1 ( , ) ( ) ( ), (
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − = π π         (24) 
Note that at the socially optimal level of mitigation e
*, private costs are higher than 
benefits (MC>MPB at point B in figure 3-1.B) suggesting that homeowners need more 
incentives to move from the competitive level of mitigation, e
p, to




Proposition 5: Contingent insurance contracts strengthen homeowner incentives for fire 
risk mitigation.  However, private mitigation effort is still suboptimal.  
 
Proposition 5 suggests that economic efficiency can be improved by encouraging more 
risk mitigation. This can be done through the use of the cost share program subsidy that 
reduces the cost of fire risk mitigation to homeowners. The question we address next is 
from a policymaker perspective to calculate the subsidy level such that homeowners 
choose the socially optimal level of mitigation e
*. 3.2-Optimal subsidy for efficient contingent insurance contract 
Government interventions through subsidies are often justified by the presence of 
market failure. In the present context, wildfire risk mitigation provides positive 
externalities in terms of expected damage reduction to neighbors. But, because 
homeowners fail to account for these benefits in their objective function, a free market 
results in under-provision of risk mitigation. Economic theory suggests that the choice of 
a subsidy that amounts to the size of the externality can restore efficiency. Let (1-α) be 
the subsidy such that the homeowner now pays αr  and the subsidy covers (1-α) r. 
Homeowners get x7 and x8 respectively in cases of fire and no fire such that 
) ( 7 e Q D e r V x j j j + − − = β α and  ) ( 8 e P e r V x j j − − = α .  
The private optimization problem is: 
[] [ ] 8 7
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Optimality conditions show that the level of mitigation e
* is chosen such that:     
D e r j j β π α ) ( '
∗ − =          ( 2 6 )  
Substituting external benefits from condition [23] into [26], we get the optimal subsidy: 
  { } D e r j j ) 1 )( ( ' ) 1 ( β π α − − = −
∗              (27) 
Condition [27] shows that for the homeowner to exert socially efficient mitigation level 
e
*, the optimal subsidy should equal the external benefit to society from additional 
mitigation effort as illustrated in figure 3-2. 
 
 Proposition 6: When the subsidy for fire risk mitigation is set to equal the net social gain 
from fire risk reduction, homeowners exert the socially efficient level of mitigation e
* and 
insurers offer insurance contracts that reflect individuals’ risks.  
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Wildfire risk in the WUI is a growing problem with high social and economical 
consequences, and affects a variety of stakeholders including fire protection agencies, 
homeowners, governments, and insurance companies. Barriers to the effective 
implementation of risk management policies range from free-riding behavior related to 
risk mitigation, to underinsurance in fire prone areas. In response, some local 
governments and insurance companies are moving toward using incentive-based approaches to promote private wildfire risk mitigation efforts. Insurers are implementing 
insurance contracts contingent upon mitigation effort, and various government agencies 
are providing cost-share programs for wildfire risk mitigation.  
In this paper, we investigate the effect of standard and contingent insurance 
contracts and government subsidies on incentives for risk mitigation by WUI residents, 
and the incentives for settlement in fire prone areas. We construct a model of migration 
decisions, where individuals choose the location that provides the highest expected utility 
given a range of location specific attributes including insurance contracts, and cost 
sharing program subsidies for fire risk mitigation. The effectiveness of non-contingent 
and contingent insurance contracts is examined in the presence (or not) of government 
cost share subsidy.  
Our analysis shows that offering mitigation-contingent insurance contracts to 
residents (or prospective residents) in the wildland-urban interface improves incentives 
for mitigation as well as incentive related to development in fire-prone areas. Residents 
of urban vicinities do not share the burden of wildfire risk.  Contingent contracts increase 
the sum of mitigation costs and premiums to owners of fire-prone property, thereby 
inducing fewer people to move into fire prone areas and increasing the risk mitigation 
efforts of those who do. Because wildfire ignores property boundaries, risk mitigation by 
one property owner can reduce the wildfire risk faced by neighbors. The fact that 
investments in risk mitigation generate positive externalities can be viewed as a 
justification for public support of mitigation efforts on private land. Our analysis shows 
that in the presence of standard insurance contracts, subsidies are ineffective for inducing private risk mitigation efforts, whereas they are more effective under contingent 
contracts.  Furthermore, whereas standard contracts in conjunction with subsidies induce 
too much development in fire-prone areas, the combination of contingent contracts and 
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